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Rational Capital Budgeting  in 
an Irrational  World* 
I.  Introduction 
The last  several  years  have  not been  good  ones 
for the  capital  asset  pricing  model  (CAPM).  A 
large  volume  of  recent  empirical  research  has 
found that (i) cross-sectional  stock  returns bear 
little or no discernible  relationship to  B  and (ii) a 
number of  other  variables  besides  B have  sub- 
stantial predictive  power  for  stock  returns.  For 
example,  one variable that has been shown to be 
an important and reliable predictor is the book- 
to-market  ratio:  the  higher  a  firm's  book-to- 
market,  the  greater its  conditional  expected  re- 
turn, all else  being equal.1 
In light of these  empirical results,  this article 
* This research is  supported by  the  National Science 
Foundation and the  International  Financial Services Re- 
search Center at Massachusetts Institute of  Technology. 
Thanks  to Maureen  O'Donnell  for assistance  in preparing  the 
manuscript  and to Michael Barclay, Doug Diamond, Steve 
Kaplan,  Jay Ritter, Dick Thaler, Luigi Zingales, an anony- 
mous referee, and  seminar participants at  the  National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research  for helpful  comments  and sug- 
gestions. 
1. Early work on the predictive  power of variables  other 
than p includes Stattman  (1980), Banz (1981), Basu (1983), 
Keim (1983), DeBondt and Thaler  (1985), Rosenberg,  Reid, 
and Lanstein (1985), Bhandari  (1988), and Jaffe, Keim, and 
Westerfield  (1989). See Fama (1991)  for a detailed  survey of 
this literature.  More recent papers  that have focused specifi- 
cally on  book-to-market  as  a  predictive variable include 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), Fama and French 
(1992), Davis  (1994), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994),  and Chan, Jegadeesh,  and Lakonishok  (1995). 
(Journal  of Business, 1996, vol. 69, no. 4) 
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This article addresses 
the following basic capi- 
tal budgeting problem: 
suppose  that cross- 
sectional  differences  in 
stock returns can be 
predicted based on vari- 
ables other than P(e.g., 
book-to-market)  and 
that this predictability 
reflects market irratio- 
nality rather than com- 
pensation for funda- 
mental risk. In this 
setting,  how should 
companies  determine 
hurdle rates? I show 
how factors  such as 
managerial time hori- 
zons  and financial con- 
straints affect the opti- 
mal hurdle rate. Under 
some circumstances,  p 
can be useful as a capi- 
tal budgeting tool,  even 
if it is of no use  in pre- 
dicting stock returns. 
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addresses a simple, yet fundamental  question: What should the aca- 
demic finance profession be telling MBA students and practitioners 
about how to set hurdle  rates for capital budgeting  decisions? Can we 
still follow the standard  textbook treatments  with a clear conscience 
and a straight  face, and march through  the mechanics of how to do 
weighted-average-cost-of-capital  or  adjusted-present-value  calcula- 
tions based on the CAPM?  Or should  we abandon  the CAPM  for capi- 
tal budgeting  purposes in favor of alternative  models that seem to do 
a better  job of fitting  actual stock-return  data? 
If one believes that the stock market  is efficient  and that the predict- 
able excess returns documented  in recent studies are, therefore,  just 
compensation  for risk-risk  that is for some reason not well captured 
by 3-then  the answer  to the question  is simple.  According  to standard 
finance logic, in an efficient market  the hurdle  rate for an investment 
in any given asset should  correspond  exactly to the prevailing  expected 
return  on the stock of a company  that is a pure play in that asset. The 
only operational  question is, Which regression specification  gives the 
best estimates of expected return?  Thus the inevitable conclusion is 
that one must throw out the CAPM  and in its place use the "new and 
improved" statistical model to set hurdle  rates. For shorthand,  I will 
label this approach to setting hurdle rates the NEER approach, for 
new estimator  of expected return. 
As an example of the NEER approach, consider a chemical com- 
pany that currently has a  low  book-to-market  ratio, and hence- 
according  to an agreed-upon  regression  specification-a  low expected 
return.  If the company  were considering  investing  in another  chemical 
plant, this approach  would argue for a relatively low hurdle  rate. The 
implicit economic argument  is this: the low book-to-market  ratio is 
indicative of the low risk of chemical-industry  assets. Given this low 
risk, it makes sense to set a low hurdle  rate. Of course, if the chemical 
company's book-to-market  ratio-and  hence its expected return- 
were to rise over time, then the hurdle  rate for capital  budgeting  pur- 
poses would have to be adjusted  upward. 
This NEER approach to capital budgeting is advocated by Fama 
and French (1993). Fama and French couch the predictive  content of 
the book-to-market  ratio and other variables in a linear multifactor- 
model setting that they argue can be interpreted  as a variant of the 
arbitrage  pricing theory (APT) or intertemporal  capital asset pricing 
model (ICAPM). They then conclude: "In principle, our results can 
be used in any application  that requires estimates of expected stock 
returns. This list includes ...  estimating  the cost of capital" (p. 53). 
However, it is critical to the Fama-French  logic that the return  dif- 
ferentials  associated with the book-to-market  ratio  and  other  predictive 
variables be thought of as compensation  for fundamental  risk. While 
there seems to be fairly widespread  agreement  that variables such as 
book-to-market  do indeed  have predictive  content, it is much  less clear Rational  Capital  Budgeting  431 
that this reflects anything  having  to do with risk. Indeed, several  recent 
papers find that there is very little affirmative  evidence that stocks 
with high book-to-market  ratios are riskier  in any measurable  sense.2 
An alternative  interpretation  of the recent empirical  literature  is that 
investors make systematic errors in forming expectations, so  that 
stocks can become significantly over- or undervalued  at particular 
points in time. As these valuation errors correct themselves, stock 
returns will move in a partially predictable  fashion. For example, a 
stock that is overvalued relative to fundamentals  will tend to have a 
low book-to-market  ratio. Over time, this overvaluation  will work its 
way out of the stock price, so the low book-to-market  ratio  will predict 
relatively low future returns.3 
In a world where predictable variations in returns are driven by 
investors' expectational  errors, it is no longer obvious that one should 
set hurdle  rates using a NEER approach.  The strong  classical argument 
for such an approach rests in part on the assumption that there is 
a one-to-one link between the expected return on a stock and the 
fundamental  economic risk of the underlying  assets. If this assumption 
is not valid, the problem becomes more complicated. Think back to 
the example of the chemical company with the low book-to-market 
ratio. If the low value of the ratio-and  hence the low expected re- 
turn-is  not indicative  of risk, but rather  reflects  the fact that investors 
are currently overoptimistic about chemical-industry  assets, does it 
make sense for rational  managers  to set a low hurdle rate and invest 
aggressively in acquiring  more such assets? 
The key point is that, when the market  is inefficient,  there can be a 
meaningful  distinction  between a NEER approach  to hurdle  rates, and 
one that focuses on a measure  of fundamental  asset risk-which  I will 
call a FAR approach. A FAR approach  involves looking directly at 
the variance  and covariance  properties  of the cash flows on the assets 
in question. In the chemical company case, this might  mean assigning 
a high hurdle rate if, for example, the cash flows from the new plknt 
were highly correlated  with the cash flows on other assets in the econ- 
omy-irrespective  of the company's current  book-to-market  ratio or 
the conditional  expected return  on its stock. 
Given this distinction  between the NEER and FAR approaches,  the 
main  goal of this article is to assess the relative  merits  of the two, and 
to illustrate how one or the other may be preferred  in a given set of 
circumstances.  To preview the results, I find  that, loosely speaking,  a 
2.  See, e.g., Lakonishok,  Shleifer,  and Vishny (1994),  Daniel  and Titman  (1995),  and 
MacKinlay  (1995).  The Daniel  and  Titman  paper  takes  direct  issue with  the Fama-French 
(1993) notion that the book-to-market  effect can be given a multifactor  risk interpre- 
tation. 
3. For evidence supporting  this interpretation,  see Lakonishok  et al. (1994)  and La- 
Porta  et al. (1995). 432  Journal of Business 
NEER approach  makes the most sense when either (i) managers  are 
interested  in maximizing  short-term  stock prices or (ii) the firm  faces 
financial  constraints  (in a sense which I will make  precise). In contrast, 
a FAR approach  is preferable  when managers  are interested in max- 
imizing  long-run  value and the firm  is not financially  constrained. 
The fact that a FAR approach can make sense in some circum- 
stances leads to an interesting  and somewhat counterintuitive  conclu- 
sion: in spite of its failure as an empirical  description  of actual stock 
returns,  the CAPM  (or something  quite like it) may still be quite useful 
from a prescriptive point of view in capital budgeting  decisions. This 
is because f3-if  calculated  properly-may  continue  to be a reasonable 
measure of the fundamental  economic risk of an asset, even if it has 
little or no predictive power for stock returns. However, it must be 
emphasized that this sort of rationale for using the CAPM does not 
apply  in all circumstances.  As noted above, when managers  have short 
horizons or when the firm  faces financial  constraints,  the CAPM-or 
any FAR-based approach-will  be inappropriate  to the extent that it 
does not present an accurate  picture  of the expected returns  on stocks. 
Before proceeding, I should also reiterate that the entire analysis 
that  follows is based on the premise  that the stock market  is inefficient. 
More precisely, cross-sectional differences  in expected returns  will be 
assumed throughout  to be driven in part by expectational errors on 
the part of investors. I make this assumption  for two reasons. First, it 
strikes me that, at the least, there is enough evidence at this point for 
one to question market  efficiency seriously and to wonder  what capital 
budgeting  rules would look like in its absence. Second, as discussed 
above, the efficient-markets  case is already  well understood  and there 
is little to add. In any event, however, readers  can  judge  for themselves 
whether or not they think the inefficient-markets  premise is palatable 
as a basis for thinking  about capital budgeting. 
Of course, this is not the first paper to raise the general  question of 
whether and how stock market inefficiencies color investment deci- 
sions. This question dates back at least to Keynes (1936, p. 151), who 
raises the possibility that "certain classes of investment  are governed 
by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange 
as revealed in the price of shares, rather  than by the genuine expecta- 
tions of the professional enterpreneur."4  More recent contributions 
include Bosworth (1975), Fischer and Merton (1984), DeLong et al. 
(1989), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)  and Blanchard,  Rhee, and 
Summers  (1993). The latter two pieces are particularly  noteworthy  in 
that they stress-as  does this article-the  importance  of managers' 
time horizons and financing  constraints.  The contribution  of this article 
4.  As will become clear, in terms of the language  of this article  Keynes is effectively 
expressing  the concern  that managers  will adopt  a NEER approach  to capital  budgeting. Rational Capital Budgeting  433 
relative to these earlier works is twofold: first, it provides a simple 
analytical framework  in which the effects of horizons and financing 
constraints  can be seen clearly and explicitly, and, second, it focuses 
on the question of what are appropriate  risk-adjusted  hurdle rates, 
thereby developing an inefficient-markets  analog to textbook treat- 
ments of capital budgeting  under uncertainty.5 
The remainder  of the article is organized  as follows. In Section II, 
I examine the link between managers'  time horizons and hurdle  rates, 
leaving aside for simplicity  the issue of financial  constraints.  This sec- 
tion establishes that a FAR approach  is more desirable  when the time 
horizon  is longer. In Section III, I introduce  the possibility  of financial 
constraints and show how these have an effect similar  to shortening 
the time horizon-that  is, financial  constraints  tend to favor a NEER 
approach.  In Section IV, I take up measurement  issues. Specifically, 
if one decides to use a FAR approach,  what is the best way to get an 
empirical  handle on fundamental  asset risk? To what extent can one 
rationalize  the use of 3-as  conventionally  calculated-as  an attempt 
to implement  a FAR approach?  Section V briefly  discusses a number 
of extensions and variations of the basic framework,  and Section VI 
fleshes out its empirical  implications. Section VII concludes the dis- 
cussion. 
II.  Time Horizons  and Optimal  Hurdle  Rates 
I consider a simple 2-period  capital  budgeting  model that is fairly stan- 
dard in most respects. At time 0, the firm in question is initially all 
equity financed. It already has physical assets in place that will pro- 
duce a single net cash flow of F at time 1. From the perspective of 
time 0, F is a random  variable that is normally  distributed.  The firm 
also has the opportunity to  invest $1 more at time 0 in identical 
assets-that  is, if it chooses to invest, its physical assets will yield a 
total of 2F at time 1. The decision of whether or not to invest is'the 
only one facing the firm  at time 0. If it does invest, the investment  will 
be financed  with riskless debt that is fairly priced in the marketplace. 
There is no possibility of issuing or repurchasing  shares. (As will be- 
come clear in Section III, allowing the firm  to transact in the equity 
market  at time 0 may in some circumstances  alter the results.) There 
are also no taxes. 
The manager  of the firm  is assumed to have rational  expectations. I 
denote the manager's  rational  time-0 forecast of F by F  = EF. The 
firm's  other outside shareholders,  however, have biased expectations. 
Their biased forecast of F is given by F" =  EF(1  +  8). Thus 8 is a 
5. In contrast,  the informal  discussion  in Blanchard  et al. (1993)  assumes  risk neutral- 
ity and, hence, does not speak to the whole issue of risk-adjusted  hurdle  rates. 434  Journal of Business 
measure of the extent to which outside investors are overoptimistic 
about  the prospects  for the firm's  physical  assets. This bias in assessing 
the value of physical assets is the only way in which the model departs 
from the standard  framework.  Outside  investors are perfectly rational 
in all other respects. For example, they perceive all variances and 
covariances accurately. Thus the degree of irrationality  that is being 
ascribed  to outside investors is in a sense quite  mild. It would certainly 
be interesting  to entertain  alternative  models of such irrationality,  but 
in the absence of clear-cut theoretical  guidance, the simple form con- 
sidered here seems a natural  place to start. 
The shares in the firm  are part of a larger  market  portfolio. The net 
cash flow payoff on the market  portfolio  at time 1 is given by M, which 
is also normally distributed. For simplicity, I assume that both the 
manager  of the firm  and all outside investors  have rational  expectations 
about  M. Thus I am effectively assuming  that  investors  make  firm-level 
mistakes in assessing cash flows, but that these mistakes wash out 
across the market  as a whole.6  I denote the price of the market  portfo- 
lio at time 0 by PM' and define RM  MIPM -  1 as the realized percent- 
age return  on the market. 
The final assumption is that the price of the firm's shares is deter- 
mined solely  by  the  expectations of  the  outside investors. This 
amounts  to saying that even though  the manager  may have a different 
opinion, he is unable or unwilling to trade in sufficient quantity to 
affect the market  price. 
With the assumptions in place, the first thing to do is to calculate 
the initial market  price, P, of the firm's shares, before the investment 
decision has been made at time 0. This is an easy task. Note that we 
are operating  in a standard  mean-variance  framework,  with the only 
exception being  that investors  have biased  expectations.  This bias does 
not vitiate many of the classical results that obtain in such a frame- 
work. First of all, investors will all hold the market portfolio, and 
the market portfolio will be-in  their eyes-mean-variance  efficient. 
Second, the equilibrium  return  required  by investors in firm's equity, 
k, will be given by 
k =  r +  r(ERM  -  r),  (1) 
where r is the riskless rate and pr  is the usual "rate-of-return  Is," 
defined as 
r  cov(F/P,  RM)Ivar(RM).  (2) 
Thus, outside investors' required  returns  are determined  as in the 
standard  CAPM. Given the cash flow expectations of these investors, 
6. Or, said somewhat more mildly, the manager  of the firm  does not disagree  with 
outside investors' assessment of M. Rational Capital Budgeting  435 
the initial price of the firm's shares, P, satisfies 
P  = Fb/(1 + k).  (3) 
Equation (3) is not a completely reduced form, however, because P 
appears  in the definition  of k and  hence is on both sides of the equation. 
Rearranging  terms, we obtain the following expression for P in terms 
of primitive  parameters: 
P  =  {Fb  -  pd(ERM  -  r)}I(1 +  r),  (4) 
where pd  is  the "dollar 1," defined as 
,d  cov(F,  RM)Ivar(RM).  (5) 
It is useful to compare  equations (1)-(4) with the analogous  expres- 
sions that would prevail in a classical setting with rational expecta- 
tions. Using asterisk  superscripts  to denote these (unobserved)  rational 
expectations values, we have 
k* =  r +  3*(ERM  -  r),  (6) 
13  *  cov(F/P*,  RM)Ivar(RM),  (7) 
P* =  FrI(l  +  k*),  (8) 
and 
P*  =  {Fr  -  pd(ERM 
-  r)}I(l  +  r).  (9) 
From a comparison  of equations (4) and (9), it can be seen that in the 
reduced  form, the only difference  between P and P* is the bias in the 
expected cash flow term. 
While outside investors perceive that the firm's stock will yield an 
expected return  of k, that is not the rational  expectation  of the stock's 
performance.  Rather,  the best estimate of conditional  expected return, 
which I will denote by CER, is 
CER = FrIP -  1 = (1 + k)/(l  + 6) -  1.  (10) 
Thus from the perspective of a rational observer such as the firm's 
manager, the stock may have a CER that is either greater or less 
than the CAPM rate k. In this sense, the model crudely captures  that 
empirical  regularity  that there are predictable  returns on stocks that 
are not related to their 13's.  These predictable  returns simply reflect 
the biases of the outside investors. Note that when 8  =  0, so that 
outside investors have no bias, CER =  k  =  k*. When 8 >  0, so that 
the stock is overpriced, CER &lt;  k &lt;  k*. And, conversely, when 8 &lt; 
0, CER >  k >  k*. 
We are now ready to address the question of the optimal hurdle 
rate. To do so, we have to be clear about the objective function that 
is being maximized. There are two distinct possibilities. First, one 436  Journal  of Business 
might  assume that the manager  seeks to maximize  the stock price that 
prevails  at time 0, immediately  after the investment  decision has been 
made. This is the same as saying that the manager  tries to maximize 
outside investors' perception of value. Alternatively,  one might posit 
that the manager seeks to maximize the present value of the firm's 
future cash flows, as seen from his more rational  perspective. 
In principle, one can think of reasons why managers  might tend to 
favor either objective. For example, if they are acting on behalf of 
shareholders  (including  themselves) who have to sell their stock in the 
near future for liquidity reasons, they will be more inclined to max- 
imize current stock prices. In contrast, if they are acting on behalf of 
shareholders  (including  themselves) who will be holding  for the longer 
term-for  example, due to capital  gains taxes or other frictions-they 
will be more inclined to maximize the present value of future cash- 
flows. In what follows, I treat the managerial  time horizon as exoge- 
nous, although  in a fuller  model it would be endogenously  determined.7 
Let us first consider the "short-horizon"  case, in which the goal is 
to maximize  the current  stock price. It is easy to see that in this case, 
the "value" created by investing is simply (P  -  1). Intuitively, as 
long as the market's  current  valuation  of the assets in question  exceeds 
the acquisition cost, the current stock price will be increased if the 
assets are purchased. To translate  this into a statement about hurdle 
rates, note that, from management's  perspective, the expected cash 
flow on the investment is Fr. Thus the short-horizon  hurdle rate, de- 
fined as hs, has the property that the gross discounted value of the 
investment, Fr/(1 +  hs), equals P. Using equation  (10), it follows im- 
mediately that 
PROPOSITION  1.  In the short-horizon  case, the manager  should dis- 
count his expected cash flow Fr at a hurdle  rate hs =  CER. In other 
words, the manager  should take a NEER approach  and use the condi- 
tional expected return  on the stock as the hurdle rate. 
One way to think about proposition 1 is that, if the manager  is inter- 
ested in maximizing the current stock price, he must cater to any 
misperceptions  that investors have. Thus if investors are overly opti- 
mistic about the prospects for the firm's assets-thereby  leading to 
a low value of CER-the  manager should be willing to invest very 
aggressively in these assets and hence should adopt a low hurdle  rate. 
Things work quite differently  in the "long-horizon"  case, in which 
7. This distinction  between maximizing  current  stock prices vs. maximizing  manage- 
ment's perception  of long-run  value also arises in the literature  on investment  and fi- 
nancing  decisions under  asymmetric  information.  See, e.g., Miller  and Rock (1985)  and 
Stein (1989)  for a fuller discussion of the forces that shape the trade-off  between the 
two objectives. One potentially  important  factor has to do with agency considerations. 
Specifically,  shareholders  may-in  response  to agency problems-impose on managers 
an incentive scheme or corporate  policies that have the effect of making  the managers 
behave  as if they were more concerned  with maximizing  current  stock prices. This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Sec. VC below. Rational Capital Budgeting  437 
the manager  seeks to maximize his perception  of the present value of 
future cash flows. In this case, the "value" created by investment 
is (P*  -  1). That is, the manager should only invest if the rational 
expectations value of the assets exceed their acquisition cost. Thus 
the long-horizon  hurdle rate hL  has the property that FrI(1 +  hL) = 
P*. Using equation (8), this leads to 
PROPOSITION  2.  In the long-horizon  case, the manager  should dis- 
count his expected cash flow Fr at a hurdle rate hL =  k*. In other 
words, the manager  should take a FAR approach  and choose a hurdle 
rate that reflects the fundamental  risk of the assets in question and 
that is independent  of outside investors' bias 8. 
Proposition 2 suggests that hurdle rates in the long-horizon case 
should be set in a "CAPM-like"  fashion. This is very close in spirit 
to the standard  textbook prescription.  However, the one major  caveat 
is that, unlike in the textbook world, one needs to be more careful in 
the empirical  implementation.  According  to equations  (6) and (7), the 
(3*  that is needed for this CAPM-like  calculation  is the (unobserved) 
3 that would prevail in a rational expectations world, as this is the 
correct measure of the fundamental  risk borne by long-horizon  inves- 
tors. And given that the underlying  premise throughout  is that the 
stock market  is inefficient,  one cannot  blithely  make  the usual assump- 
tion that a  3 calculated in the traditional  way-with  a regression of 
the firm's stock returns  on market  returns-will  provide an adequate 
proxy for the (3*  that is called for in proposition 2. Thus there is a 
nontrivial  set of issues surrounding  the best way to measure  13*.  These 
issues are taken up in detail in Section VI below. 
III.  Financing  Considerations  and Optimal  Hurdle  Rates 
So far, the analysis  has ignored  the possibility  that  the firm  might  either 
issue or repurchase shares. Given the premise-that  the market is 
inefficient  and that managers  know it-this  is a potentially  important 
omission. First of all, there will naturally  be circumstances  in which 
managers  wish to engage in stock issues or repurchases  to take advan- 
tage of market inefficiencies. Second, and more significant  for our 
purposes, there may, in some cases, be a link between these opportu- 
nistic financing  maneuvers  and the optimal  hurdle  rate for capital  bud- 
geting. 
The goal of this section is to explore these links between financing 
considerations  and hurdle  rates. I begin with a general  formulation  of 
the problem.  I then consider  a series of special cases that yield particu- 
larly crisp results and that highlight  the most important  intuition. 
A.  A General  Formulation  of the Problem 
When a manager  chooses an investment-financing  combination  in an 
inefficient  market,  there are, in general,  three considerations  that must 438  Journal of Business 
be taken into account: (1) the net present value of the investment, 
(2) the "market timing" gains or losses  associated with any share 
issues or repurchases, and (3) the extent to which the investment- 
financing  combination  leads to any costly deviations  from the optimal 
capital  structure  for the firm.  Thus, in order  to specify an overall  objec- 
tive function, one must spell out each of these considerations  in detail.8 
1.  The Net Present Value of Investment 
As will become clear, to the extent that financing  considerations  have 
any consequence at all for hurdle rates, it is to effectively shorten 
managers'  time horizons-that  is, to make them behave in more of a 
NEER fashion. Therefore, to make the analysis interesting,  I assume 
that absent financing  concerns, managers  take a FAR approach,  and 
seek to maximize the present value of future cash flows. 
For the purpose of doing a bit of calculus, I generalize  slightly  from 
the previous section, and allow the amount  invested at time 0 to be a 
continuous variable K. The gross expected proceeds at time 1 from 
this investment are given by f(K),  which is an increasing, concave 
function. The relevant FAR-based definition  of the net present value 
of investment  is thus f(K)P*/F'  -  K, or equivalently, f(K)/(l  +  k*) 
-  K, where k* continues to be given by equations (6) and (7). 
2.  Market  Timing  Gains or Losses 
Denote by E the dollar amount  of equity raised by selling new shares 
at time 0. Thus, if E >  0, this should be interpreted  as an equity issue 
by the firm;  if E &lt;  0, this should be interpreted  as a repurchase.  If the 
firm is able to transact in its own equity without any price-pressure 
effects, the market  timing gains from the perspective of the manager 
are given simply by the difference between the market's  initial  time-0 
valuation  of the shares  and  the manager's  time-0  valuation.  For a trans- 
action of size E, this market  timing  gain is simply E(1 -  P*IP).9 
Of course, it is extreme and unrealistic  to assume that there are no 
price-pressure  effects whatsoever, particularly  if the implied equity 
transactions  turn out to be large in absolute magnitude.  At the same 
time, given the premise  of investor  irrationality,  one does not necessar- 
ily want to go to the other extreme-represented by rational  asymmet- 
ric information  models such as that of Myers and Majluf  (1984)-and 
assume that the announcement  effects of a share issue or repurchase 
8. One possibility that I ignore for the time being is that managers  might wish to 
take advantage  of market  inefficiencies  by transacting  in the stock of other firms.  This 
consideration  is taken up in Sec. VD below, and, as will be seen, need not materially 
affect the conclusions  of the analysis. 
9. As above, I continue  to assume that when the firm  issues debt, this debt is fairly 
priced, so that there are no market timing gains or losses. This assumption  can be 
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are such that they, on average, completely eliminate  the potential  for 
market  timing gains. 
As a compromise,  I adopt a simple, relatively  unstructured  formula- 
tion in which the net-of-price-pressure  market  timing gains are given 
by E(1  -  P*1P)  -  i(E).  Here  i(E)  captures  the price-impact-related 
losses associated with an equity transaction  of size E, with i(O) =  0. 
The only other restrictions  I impose a priori  are, first, when E > 0, dil 
dE '  0, and, conversely, when E &lt;  0, dildE &lt;  0; second, d2iMdE2  2 
0 everywhere. In words, equity issues tend to knock prices down, 
while repurchases  push prices up, with larger  effects for larger  transac- 
tions in either direction. 
The i(E) function can be interpreted  in terms of a couple of different 
underlying  phenomena. First, it might  be that even irrational  investors 
do update their beliefs somewhat when they see management  under- 
taking an equity transaction.  However, in contrast to rational  models 
based on asymmetric  information,  the updating  is insufficient  to wipe 
out predictable  excess returns. This interpretation  fits with the spirit 
of recent studies that suggest that the market  underreacts  dramatically 
to the information  contained in both seasoned equity offerings and 
repurchases.10  Alternatively, in the case of share repurchases, i(E) 
might  be thought  of as reflecting  the premium  that tendering  investors 
require  to compensate them for capital gains taxes. 
3.  The Costs of Deviating from Optimal  Capital  Structure 
Finally, one must consider the possibility that a given investment- 
financing  combination  will lead to a suboptimal  capital structure.  For 
example, if a firm decides to invest a great deal and to engage in 
repurchases  to take advantage  of a low stock price, leverage may in- 
crease to the point where expected costs of financial  distress become 
significant.  To capture this possibility in a simple way, I assume that 
the optimal  debt ratio for the firm  is given by D, and that, prior  to the 
investment and financing  choices at time 0, the firm  is exactly at this 
optimum. Thus, after it has invested an amount K and raised an 
amount of new equity E, it will be overleveraged  by an amount  L- 
K(l  -  D)  -  E.  I assume  that this imposes  a cost  of Z(L). 
Again, I do not put too much a priori  structure  on the Z(L)  function. 
By definition, things are normalized so that Z(0) =  0. In principle, 
straying  in either direction  from the optimum  of 0 can be costly-too 
little debt may be a problem as well as too much debt. Moreover, to 
the extent that there are costs of straying, these costs are a convex 
function of the distance from the optimum.  As with the i(E) function, 
10. See, e.g.,  Cheng (1995), Loughran  and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck- 
Graves  (1995)  on seasoned  equity  offerings,  and  Ikenberry,  Lakonishok,  and  Vermaelen 
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this implies that dZIdL -  0 when L >  0, and, conversely, dZIdL  '  0 
when L &lt;  0; also, d2ZIdL2  2  0 everywhere. 
4.  Optimal  Investment and Financing  Decisions 
Taking  all three considerations  together, the manager's  objective  func- 
tion is 
maxf(K)P*IFr  -  K + E(1  -  P*1P) -  i(E) -  Z(L),  (11) 
subject to 
L-K(1  -  D)  -  E. 
The first-order  conditions for this problem  are 
dftdK -  [1 +  (1 -  D)dZIdL]FrIP*  = 0,  (12) 
(1 -  P*  P)-dildE  +  dZIdL =  0.  (13) 
A little algebra  shows that optimal  investment  therefore satisfies 
dfldK = DFrIP* +  (1 -  D)(FrIP +  dildE)  (14) 
= D(1  +  k*) +  (1 -  D)(1  +  CER +  diudE). 
B.  Case-by-Case  Analysis 
Since the intuition underlying  equation (14) may not be immediately 
apparent, it is useful to go through  a series of special cases to build 
an understanding  of the various forces at work. 
1.  Capital  Structure  Is Not a Binding  Constraint 
The first, simplest limiting case to consider is one in which dZIdL  = 
0-that  is, there are no marginal  costs or benefits  to changing  leverage, 
other  than  those that come directly  from  issuing  or repurchasing  shares 
at time 0. This condition would clearly hold in a world with no taxes 
and no costs of financial  distress, where, were it not for the.  mispricing 
of the firm's stock, the Modigliani-Miller  theorem would apply. But 
more generally, one need not make such strong assumptions  for this 
case to be (approximately)  relevant. All that is really required  is that 
the Z function be flat in the neighborhood  of the optimal solution. 
For example, if price-pressure  effects are significant,  and diminishing 
returns  to investment set in quickly, the firm  will only choose to make 
small investment and financing  adjustments,  and thus will never try to 
push capital structure  very far from its initial  position of L =  0. If, in 
addition, the Z function happens to be flat in this region near 0, the 
firm  will be left in a position where, for example, incremental  increases 
in leverage would have only a trivial impact on costs of financial  dis- 
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FIG. 1.-Investment  and financing  policies when capital structure  is not a 
constraint. 
When dZIdL =  0, equations (12) and (13) tell us that investment 
and financing  decisions are fully separable.  Intuitively,  this is because 
capital structure can at the margin adjust costlessly to take up the 
slack between the two. The optimal  behavior  for the firm  in this case 
is spelled out in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  3.  When capital structure  is not a binding  constraint, 
and the manager  has long horizons, the optimal  policies are always to 
set the hurdle  rate at the FAR value of k*, as in proposition  2, and to 
issue stock if the CER &lt;  k*, but repurchase  stock if the CER > k*. 
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal investment and financing  policies. 
As can be seen, the two are completely decoupled. When the stock 
price is low and the CER is high, the firm  repurchases  shares. How- 
ever, because capital structure  is fully flexible, the repurchase  does 
not affect its hurdle rate. Rather, the firm adjusts to the repurchase 
purely by taking on more debt. Therefore, at the margin,  investment 
should be evaluated vis-a-vis fairly priced debt finance, exactly as in 
Section II above. 
Conversely, when the stock price is high and the CER is low, the 
firm  issues shares. However, it does not have to plow the proceeds of 
the share issue into investment. These proceeds can be used to pay 
down debt or accumulate  cash. So there is no reason that the issuance 
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2.  Binding  Capital  Structure  Constraint,  No Price-Pressure  Effects 
The next case to examine is one in which the capital structure  con- 
straint  is binding,  but where price-pressure  effects are absent-that  is, 
one in which dZIdL =$  0 and dildE =  0. In this case, equation (14) 
simplifies  to 
dfldK = D(1  +  k*) +  (1 -  D)(1  +  CER).  (15) 
Based on equation (15), we have: 
PROPOSITION  4.  When the capital  structure  constraint  is binding  and 
there are no price-pressure  considerations,  the optimal  hurdle  rate has 
the following properties: the hurdle rate is between the NEER and 
FAR values of CER and k*, respectively; as D  approaches 0, the 
hurdle rate converges to CER, as in proposition 1; as D approaches 
1, the hurdle  rate converges to k*, as in proposition  2. 
The intuition behind proposition 4 is  very simple. When capital 
structure  imposes a binding  constraint, one cannot, in general, sepa- 
rate investment and financing  decisions. This is perhaps  easiest to see 
in the case where 8 &lt;  0,  so that the stock is undervalued  and the firm 
would like to repurchase shares. For each dollar that is devoted to 
investment, there is less cash available  to engage in such repurchases, 
holding  the capital structure  fixed. Indeed, in the extreme case where 
D = 0-that  is, where the incremental  investment  has zero debt capac- 
ity-each  dollar of investment leaves one full dollar  less available  for 
repurchases. Hence, in this case, the opportunity  cost of investment 
is simply the expected return  on the stock, as in the NEER approach. 
Thus, in the limiting  case where D  =  0, financial  constraints  force 
managers who would otherwise take a long-run view into behaving 
exactly as  if they were interested in maximizing short-term stock 
prices. This is simply  because, in order  to leave capital  structure  undis- 
turbed, any investment must be fully funded by an immediate stock 
issue, so all that matters  is the market's  current  assessment of whether 
the investment is attractive  or not. 
In the intermediate  cases, where 0 &lt;  D &lt;  1, investment  need only 
be partially  funded by a stock issue. This implies that the hurdle  rate 
moves less than one-for-one  with the CER on the stock. At the other 
extreme, when D  =  1 and investment can be entirely debt financed, 
the hurdle  rate remains  anchored  at the FAR value of k*, irrespective 
of the CER on the stock.11  Figure  2 illustrates  the relationship  between 
the hurdle rate and the CER on the stock for different  values of D. 
3.  Binding  Capital  Structure  Constraint  and Price-Pressure  Effects 
The final case to consider is the most general one where the capital 
structure  constraint  is binding  and where there are price-pressure  ef- 
11. Of course, one should not take this limiting  case too literally,  given that I have 
also assumed  that the firm  can issue fairly  priced  (i.e., riskless)  debt. Rational  Capital  Budgeting  443 
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FIG. 2.-Optimal  hurdle rates with binding capital structure constraint and 
no price-pressure  effects. 
fects.  This case is most usefully attacked by breaking  it down into 
subcases. 
Stock is undervalued:  8 &lt;  0.  When 8 &lt;  0,  it is easy to show that 
L >  0. That is, the firm will choose to be overlevered relative to the 
static optimal capital structure  of L  =  0. However, the sign of E is 
ambiguous,  the firm  may either issue or repurchase  shares. This ambi- 
guity in E arises because there are two competing  effects: on the one 
hand, the fact that 8 &lt;  0 makes a repurchase  attractive  from a market 
timing standpoint; on the other, given that the firm is investing, it 
needs to raise some new equity if it does not wish to see its capital 
structure  get too far out of line. Depending  on which effect dominates, 
there can either be a net share repurchase  or a share issue. In the case 
of share repurchase  (E &lt;  0), it is straightforward  to verify: 
PROPOSITION  5.  When the capital structure constraint is binding, 
there are price-pressure  considerations, 8 &lt;  0 and E &lt;  0, then the 
optimal hurdle rate has the following properties: the hurdle rate is 
always between the NEER and FAR values; the stronger  the price- 
pressure effects-that  is, the larger is duldE  in absolute magnitude- 
the lower the hurdle rate, all else equal, and therefore  the closer the 
hurdle  rate is to the FAR value of k*. 444  Journal of Business 
Proposition 5 says that this case represents a well-behaved  middle 
ground  between the two more extreme cases covered in propositions 
3 and 4. When price-pressure  effects are strong, the outcome is closer 
to that in proposition 3, where capital structure  is not a binding  con- 
straint-the  hurdle  rate is set more according  to a FAR approach.  This 
is because price pressure leads the firm to limit the scale of its re- 
purchase activity. Consequently, capital structure is not much dis- 
torted, and there is less influence of financial constraints on invest- 
ment. Of course,  when price-pressure effects  are very weak,  we 
converge back to the case described in proposition 4. The outcome 
with an equity issue (E >  0) is a bit more counterintuitive: 
PROPOSITION  6.  When the capital structure constraint is binding, 
there are price-pressure  considerations, 8  &lt;  0 and E >  0, then the 
optimal hurdle rate has the following properties:  The hurdle rate no 
longer necessarily lies between the NEER and FAR values; in particu- 
lar, it may exceed them both, though  it will never be below the lower of 
the two, namely the FAR value of k*. The stronger  are price-pressure 
effects-that  is, the larger  di/dE is in absolute magnitude-the  higher 
the hurdle  rate, all else equal. 
Thus here is a situation-the  first we have encountered so far- 
where the hurdle  rate does not lie between the NEER and FAR values. 
However, this result  has nothing  really  to do with the market  irrational- 
ity that is the focus of this article. Rather, it is just a variant  on the 
Myers-Majluf  (1984)  argument  that  when investment  requires  an equity 
issue, and such an equity issue knocks stock prices down, there will 
typically be underinvestment.  Indeed, the effect is seen most cleanly 
by assuming  that there is no irrationality  whatsoever-that  is, that  8 = 
0-so  that the NEER and FAR values coincide. Inspection  of equation 
(14) tells us that optimal investment will satisfy dfldK =  (1 +  k*) + 
(1 -  D)dildE. In other words, the hurdle rate is a markup  over the 
NEER/FAR value of k*, with the degree of this markup  determined 
by the magnitude  of the price-pressure  effect. 
Stock is overvalued: 8 >  0.  When 8  >  0, there is no. ambiguity 
about the sign of E. This is because both market  timing  considerations 
and the need to finance investment now point in the same direction, 
implying a desire to sell stock. So E >  0. This gives rise to a result 
very similar  to that seen just above: 
PROPOSITION  7.  When the capital structure constraint is binding, 
there are price-pressure  considerations, 8  >  0 and E >  0, then the 
optimal hurdle rate has the following properties:  The hurdle rate no 
longer  necessarily lies between the NEER and FAR values. In particu- 
lar, it may exceed them both, though it will never be below the lower 
of the two, namely, the NEER value of CER. The stronger  the price- 
pressure effects-that  is, the larger di/dE is in absolute magnitude- 
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C.  Conclusions on the Effects of Financing Considerations 
The analysis of this section has shown that financing  considerations 
shape the optimal hurdle rate in three distinct ways. The first factor 
that matters  is the shape of the Z function, which measures  the degree 
to which deviations in capital structure  are costly. When such devia- 
tions are inconsequential,  this tends to favor a FAR-based approach 
to setting hurdle rates. In contrast, when such deviations are costly, 
the optimal  hurdle rate is pushed in the NEER direction. 
The second factor is the debt capacity, D, of the new investment. 
This second factor interacts with the first. In particular,  the lower is 
D, the more pronounced an effect capital structure  constraints  have 
in terms of driving  the hurdle  rate toward the NEER value. 
The third factor is the extent to which share issues or repurchases 
have price-pressure  consequences. In terms  of the NEER-FAR  dichot- 
omy, the impact  of this third  factor is somewhat  more ambiguous  than 
that of the other two. One can make a clear-cut  statement  only in the 
case where the firm  engages in a stock repurchase;  here price-pressure 
considerations  unambiguously  move the hurdle  rate closer to the FAR 
value of k*. However, when the firm issues equity, all that one can 
say for sure is that price pressure exerts an upward  influence  on the 
hurdle rate; it no longer follows that the hurdle  rate is pushed closer 
to the FAR value. 
The overall message of this section is that, while one can certainly 
argue  in favor of a FAR-based  approach  to capital  budgeting,  the argu- 
ment is somewhat  more delicate than  it might  have appeared  in Section 
II, and it does not apply  in all circumstances.  In order  for a FAR-based 
approach  to make sense, not only must managers  have long horizons, 
but they must be relatively  unconstrained  by their  current  capital  struc- 
tures. 
IV.  Implementing  a FAR-Based  Approach:  Measuring * 
Part of the appeal of a FAR-based approach  to capital budgeting  is 
that it appears  to be very close to the textbook CAPM  method. How- 
ever, as noted in Section II above, the one hitch is that, in order to 
implement a FAR-based approach, one needs to know P*, which is 
the value of IP  that would prevail in a rational expectations world; 
that is, the fundamental  risk of the assets in question. And given the 
underlying premise of  the article-that  the stock market is  ineffi- 
cient-one  cannot simply assume that a IP  calculated  using observed 
stock returns will  yield a  good  estimate of  P3*.  Thus the follow- 
ing question arises: as a practical matter, how close to 13*  can one 
expect to get using the standard  regression  methodology  for calculat- 
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A.  Theoretical  Considerations 
In order  to clarify the issues, it is useful to begin with a more detailed 
analytical  comparison  of the value of a ,3 computed  from actual stock 
return  data-which  I will continue to denote by 13r-versus  that of 13*. 
To do so, I will generalize somewhat from the setting of the previous 
sections by entertaining  the possibility that there is mispricing  of the 
market  as a whole as well as mispricing  of individual  stocks. In addi- 
tion, and somewhat trivially, I will allow for more than one period's 
worth of stock returns. 
Note that in any period t, for any stock i, we can always make the 
following decomposition: 
Rit-=R* + Nit,  (16) 
where Ri, is the observed return on the stock, R* is the return that 
would prevail in a rational  expectations world  that is, the portion  of 
the observed return due to "fundamentals"-and  Nit is the portion 
of the observed return due to "noise." We can also make a similar 
decomposition  for the observed return  on the market  as a whole, RMt: 
RMt-R*t  +  NMt.  (17) 
Clearly, as a general matter, the 1 calculated  from observed stock 
returns,  13i  -  cov(Rit,  RMf)Ivar(RMt)  will not coincide  with 13*  =  cov (Rit 
R* )Ivar(R*1).  To  get  a  better  intuitive  handle  on  the  sources  of 
the difference  between 13l  and 13*,  it is helpful  to consider  a simple  case 
where  bothR* and  Nit  are  generated  by one-factor  processes, as follows: 
R  =  fj-*R*t  + Eit,  (18) 
Nit =  OINMt  +  pit  (19) 
where  COV(Ei,  F1it)  =  0.  12 In this formulation,  Oi  represents  the sensitiv- 
ity of stock i's noise component  to the noise component  on the market 
as a whole-that  is, Oi  is a "noise 1" for stock i. 
It is now easy to calculate 13A: 
P3  =  [hi  var(Rm) +  Oivar(NM)  +  (hi  +  Oi)cov(R*, NM)]!  (20) 
[var(R*)  +  var(NM) +  2cov(R*,NM)]. 
From (20), one can see how various  parameters  influence  the relative 
magnitudes  13i  and hi*.  The most important  conclusion  for our purposes 
12. Note that  the 2-period  model  used in Secs. II and  III above  does not quite  conform 
to this specification.  This is because all mispricing  is assumed  to disappear  after  the first 
period, which in turn implies that there are not enough degrees of freedom to also 
assume that cov(Fi,,  p,)  =  0. However, the simple specification  of eqq. (18) and (19) is 
merely an expositional  device that allows one to illustrate  the important  effects more 
clearly. Rational Capital Budgeting  447 
is that it is not obvious a priori that one will be systematically  larger 
or smaller  than the other. Indeed, in some circumstances,  they will be 
exactly equal. For example, if var(NM) =  0, so that all noise is firm 
specific and washes out at the aggregate  level, then S  =  h  Alterna- 
tively, the same result obtains if there is marketwide  noise, but Oi  = 
O  Although  these cases are clearly special, they do illustrate  a more 
general point: a stock may be subject to very large absolute pricing 
errors-in  the sense of var(Ni) being very large-and  yet one might 
in principle  be able to retrieve quite reasonable  estimates of Of from 
stock-price data."3  Whether this is true in practice is, then, a purely 
empirical  question. 
B.  Existing Evidence 
In order  to ascertain  whether  a  3  estimated  from stock-price  data does 
in fact do a good job of capturing  the sort of fundamental  risk envi- 
sioned in A*, one needs to develop an empirical  analog of A*. A natu- 
ral, though somewhat crude, approach  would be as follows. Suppose 
one posits that the rational  expectations value of a stock is the present 
value of the expected cash flows to equity, discounted at a constant 
rate. Suppose further  that cash flows follow a random  walk, so today's 
level is a sufficient  statistic for future  expectations. In this very simple 
case, it is easy to show that for any given stock i: 
=  cov(AFi/Fi, AM/M)/var(AM/M),  (21) 
where Fi and M are the cash flows accruing  to stock i and the market 
as a whole, respectively. This is a quantity that can be readily esti- 
mated and then compared to the corresponding  P3's  estimated from 
stock prices. 
In fact, there is an older literature,  beginning  with Ball and Brown 
(1969)  and Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970),  that undertakes  a very 
similar  comparison.  In this literature,  the basic hypothesis  being tested 
is whether "accounting P3's"  for either individual  stocks or portfolios 
are correlated with P3's  estimated from stock returns.4 In some of 
this work-notably  Beaver and Manegold  (1975)-accounting P3's  are 
defined  in a way that is very similar  to equation  (21), with the primary 
13. A second implication  of (20) is that if the marketwide  noise is stationary,  one 
might  be able to obtain  better estimates  of ,  by using longer-horizon  returns.  At suffi- 
ciently  long horizons,  the variance  of R* will dominate  the other  terms  in (20),  ultimately 
leading W  to converge to Pt*. 
14. The motivation behind this earlier literature  is quite different  from that here, 
however. In the 1970s work, market  efficiency is taken for granted,  and the question 
posed is whether accounting  measures of risk are informative,  in the sense of being 
related  to market-based  measures  of risk (which  are assumed  to be objectively  correct). 
In addition  to the papers  mentioned  in the text, see also Gonedes  (1973, 1975)  for further 
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exception being that an accounting net income number is typically 
used in place of a cash flow. 
Subject to this one accounting-related  caveat, Beaver and Mane- 
gold's (1975)  results would seem to indicate  that there is indeed  a fairly 
close correspondence  between stock market  Pt's  and fundamental  risk. 
For example, with 10-stock  portfolios, the Spearman  correlation  coef- 
ficient between accounting  and stock-return  Pt's  varies from about .70 
to .90, depending  on the exact specification  used. 
The bottom line is that both theoretical  considerations  and existing 
empirical evidence suggest that, at the least, it may not be totally 
unreasonable  to assume simultaneously  that stocks are subject  to large 
pricing  errors  and that a (3  estimated  from stock returns  can provide a 
good measure of the fundamental  asset risk variable A* needed to 
implement  a FAR-based approach  to capital  budgeting.15 
V.  Extensions  and Variations 
The analysis in Sections II and III above has made a number  of strong 
simplifying  assumptions.  In some cases, it is easy to see how the basic 
framework could be extended so as to relax these assumptions; in 
other cases, it is clear that the problem becomes substantially  more 
complex and that more work is required. 
A.  Alternative  Measures of Fundamental  Risk 
One assumption  that has been maintained  until  now is that the underly- 
ing structure  of the economy is such that A* is the appropriate  sum- 
mary statistic for an asset's fundamental  risk. This need not be the 
case.  One can redo the entire analysis in a world where there is a 
multifactor representation of fundamental  risk, such as that which 
emerges from the APT or the ICAPM. In either case, the spirit of 
the conclusions would be unchanged-these  alternative  risk measures, 
would be used instead of A* to determine FAR-based hurdle rates. 
Whether  or not such FAR-based hurdle rates would actually be used 
for capital budgeting purposes-as  opposed to NEER-based hurdle 
rates-would  continue  to depend on the same factors identified  above, 
namely managers'  time horizons and financing  constraints. 
The harder  question this raises is how can one know a priori  which 
is the right model of fundamental  risk. For once one entertains the 
premise that the market is inefficient, it may become difficult  to use 
15. Of course, this statement  may be reasonable  on average  and at the same time be 
more appropriate  for some categories  of stocks than  for others. To take  just one exam- 
ple, some stocks-e.g.,  those included  in the S&P  500-might have more  of a tendency 
to covary excessively with a market  index. This would tend to bias measured  PB's  for 
these particular  stocks toward one and thereby present a misleading  picture of their 
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empirical data in a straightforward  fashion to choose between, say, 
a r* representation  of fundamental  risk and a multifactor  APT-type 
representation.  Clearly,  one cannot simply  run  atheoretical  horse races 
and see which factors better predict expected returns.  For such horse 
races may tell us more about the nature  of market  inefficiencies  than 
about the structure  of the underlying  fundamental  risk. In particular, 
a book-to-market  "factor"-a  la Fama and French (1993)-may  do 
well in prediction  equations,  but given the lack of a theroretical  model, 
it would seem inappropriate  to unquestioningly  interpret  this factor as 
a measure of fundamental  risk. (Unless, of course, one's priors are 
absolute that the market  is efficient, in which case the distinction  be- 
tween NEER and FAR vanishes, and everything in this article be- 
comes irrelevant.) 
B.  Managers Are Not Sure They  Are Smarter  than the Market 
Thus far, the discussion has proceeded as if a manager's  estimate of 
future  cash flow is always strictly  superior  to that  of outside sharehold- 
ers. However, a less restrictive interpretation  is also possible. One 
might suppose that outside shareholders'  forecast of F,-while  con- 
taining  some noise, also embodies some information  not directly  avail- 
able to managers.  In this case, the optimal  thing  for a rational  manager 
to do would be to put some weight on his own private  information  and 
some weight on outside shareholders'  forecast. That  is, the manager's 
rational  forecast, F,  would be the appropriate  Bayesian combination 
of the manager's private information  and the market forecast. The 
analysis would then go forward exactly as before. So one does not 
need to interpret  FAR-based  capital  budgeting  as dictating  that manag- 
ers completely ignore market signals in favor of their own beliefs; 
rather  it simply  implies  that they will be less responsive  to such market 
signals than with NEER-based capital  budgeting. 
C.  Agency Considerations 
Suppose we have a firm that is financially  unconstrained  and whose 
shareholders  all plan to hold onto their  shares  indefinitely.  The analysis 
above might seem to suggest that such a firm should adopt a FAR- 
based approach  to capital budgeting.  But this conclusion rests in part 
on the implicit  assumption  that the manager  who makes the cash flow 
forecasts and carries out the capital budgeting  decisions acts in the 
interests of  shareholders. More realistically, there may be  agency 
problems, and managers  may have a desire to overinvest relative to 
what would be optimal.  If this is the case, and  if the manager's  forecast 
F  is not verifiable, shareholders  may want to adopt ex ante capital 
budgeting  policies that constrain  investment  in some fashion. 
One possibility-though  not necessarily the optimal one-is  for 
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geting rules. An advantage of NEER-based capital budgeting in an 
agency context is that it brings  to bear some information  about  F that 
is verifiable. Specifically, under the assumptions  of the model above, 
shareholders  can always observe whether or not NEER-based  capital 
budgeting  is being adhered to simply by looking at market  prices. In 
contrast,  if the manager  is left with the discretion  to pursue  FAR-based 
capital budgeting, there is always the worry that he will overinvest 
and explain it away as a case where the privately  observed F' is very 
high relative to the forecast implicit in market prices. Of course, if 
shareholders  have long horizons, there is also a countervailing  cost 
to imposing NEER-based capital budgeting  to the extent that market 
forecasts contain not only some valid information  about  F, but biases 
as well. 
This discussion highlights  the following  limitation  of the formal  anal- 
ysis: while I have been treating managers' horizons as exogenous, 
they would, in a more complete model, be endogeneously  determined. 
Moreover,  in such a setting, managerial  horizons  might  not correspond 
to those of the shareholders  for whom they are working. If agency 
considerations  are important,  shareholders  may choose ex ante to set 
up corporate  policies or incentive schemes that effectively foreshorten 
managerial  horizons, even when this distorts investment  decisions.16 
D.  Portfolio Trading  in the Stock of Other  Firms 
To this point, I have ignored  the possibility that managers  might  wish 
to take advantage of market inefficiencies by transacting  in stocks 
other than their own. To see why this possibility  might  be relevant  for 
capital budgeting, consider a manager  who perceives that his firm's 
stock is underpriced,  say, because it has a high book-to-market  ratio. 
On the one hand, as discussed above, this might  lead the manager  to 
engage in repurchases  of his own stock. And to the extent that such 
repurchases  push capital  structure  away from  its optimum  level of L = 
0, they will spill over and affect investment  decisions-in  this particu- 
lar case, raising  the hurdle  rate from its FAR value in the direction  of 
the higher NEER value. 
On the other hand, the capital structure  complications associated 
with own-stock repurchases  lead one to ask whether there are other 
ways for the manager  to make  essentially  the same speculative  bet. For 
example, he might  create a zero net-investment  portfolio,  consisting  of 
16. This is already  a very familiar  theme in the corporate  finance  literature,  particu- 
larly that on takeovers. For example, it has been argued  that it can be in the interest  of 
shareholders  to remove impediments  to takeovers as a way of improving  managerial 
incentives, even when the resulting  foreshortening  of managerial  horizons  leads to dis- 
torted investment. See, e.g.,  Laffont and Tirole (1988), Scharfstein  (1988) and Stein 
(1988).  Note, however, that  these earlier  papers  make  the point  without  invoking  market 
irrationality,  but rather  simply  appeal  to asymmetries  of information  between managers 
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long positions in other high book-to-market  stocks and short  positions 
in low book-to-market  stocks. An apparent  advantage  of this approach 
is that it does not alter his own firm's capital structure. 
For the purposes of this article, the bottom line question  is whether 
the existence of such portfolio  trading  opportunities  changes the basic 
conclusions offered in Section III above. The answer is, it depends. 
In particular,  the pivotal issue is whether the other trading  opportuni- 
ties are sufficiently  attractive  and available  that they completely  elimi- 
nate managers'  desire to distort capital structure  away from the first- 
best of L = 0. If so, capital  structure  constraints  will become irrelevant 
for hurdle rates, leading to strictly FAR-based capital budgeting. If 
not, the qualitative  conclusions offered in Section III will continue to 
hold, with binding  capital structure  constraints  pushing  hurdle  rates in 
the direction of NEER values. 
Ultimately, the outcome depends on a number  of factors that are 
not explicitly modeled above. First, while "smart money" managers 
can presumably  exploit some simple inefficiencies-like  the book-to- 
market effect-by  trading  in other stocks using only easily available 
public data, it seems plausible  that they can do even better by trading 
in their own stock. If this is the case, there will be circumstances  in 
which the existence of other trading  opportunities  does not eliminate 
the desire to  transact in own-company stock, and the basic story 
sketched in Section III will still apply. A second unmodeled  factor that 
is likely to be important  is the extent to which firms  exhibit risk aver- 
sion with respect to passive portfolio positions. If such risk aversion 
is pronounced, it will again be the case that the existence of other 
trading  opportunities  is not a perfect substitute  for transactions  in own- 
company  stock.17 
E.  Richer Models of Irrationality 
Finally, and perhaps  most fundamentally,  another  area that could use 
further  development is the specification  of investors' misperceptions 
about key parameters.  I have adopted the simplest possible approach 
here, assuming  that all investors are homogeneous  and that their only 
misperception  has to do with the expected value of future firm cash 
flows. In reality, there are likely to be important  heterogeneities  across 
outside investors. Moreover, estimates of other parameters-such  as 
variances and covariances-may  also be subject  to systematic  biases. 
It would be interesting  to see how robust the qualitative  conclusions 
of this article are to these and related extensions. 
17. One can imagine a number  of reasons for such risk aversion at the corporate 
level. For example,  Froot, Scharfstein,  and  Stein  (1993)  develop  a model  in which  capital 
market  imperfections  lead firms to behave in a risk-averse  fashion, particularly  with 
respects  to those risks-such  as portfolio  trading-that are  uncorrelated  with  their  phys- 
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VI.  Empirical  Implications 
Traditional  efficient-markets-based  models conclude that a firm's in- 
vestment behavior ought to be closely linked to its stock price. And, 
indeed, a substantial  body of empirical  research  provides evidence for 
such a link.18 At the same time, however, a couple of recent papers 
have found that once one controls for fundamentals  like profits and 
sales, the incremental  explanatory  power of stock prices for corporate 
investment, while statistically significant,  is quite limited  in economic 
terms, both in firm-level  and aggregate  data (Morck  et al. 1990;  Blanch- 
ard et al.  1993). Thus it appears that, relative to these fundamental 
variables, the stock market  may be something  of a sideshow in terms 
of its influence  on corporate  investment. 
This sideshow phenomenon is easy to rationalize  in the context of 
the model presented  above. If the market  is inefficient,  and  if managers 
are for the most part engaging in FAR-based capital budgeting, one 
would not expect investment to track stock prices nearly  as closely as 
in a classical world. Perhaps  more interestingly,  however, this paper's 
logic allows one to go further  in terms  of empirical  implications.  Rather 
than simply saying the theory is consistent with existing evidence, it 
is also possible to generate some novel cross-sectional  predictions. 
These cross-sectional  predictions  flow from the observation  that not 
all firms should have the same propensity  to adopt FAR-based  capital 
budgeting  practices. In particular,  FAR-based  capital  budgeting  should 
be more prevalent  among either firms  with very strong  balance sheets 
(who, in terms of the language  of the model are presumably  operating 
in a relatively flat region of the Z function)  or those whose assets offer 
substantial  debt capacity. In contrast, firms  with weak balance sheets 
and hard-to-collateralize  assets-for  example, a cash-strapped  soft- 
ware development  company-should  tend to follow NEER-based  cap- 
ital budgeting. Thus the testable prediction is that the cash-strapped 
software company should have investment that responds more sensi- 
tively to movements  in its stock price than, say, an AAA-related  utility 
with lots of tangible assets. 
A similar sort of reasoning can be used to generate predictions  for 
the patterns of asset sales within and across industries.  For concrete- 
ness, consider two airlines, one financially  constrained,  the other not. 
Now suppose that a negative wave of investor sentiment  knocks air- 
line-industry stock prices down and thereby drives conditional ex- 
pected returns up. The constrained airline, which uses NEER-based 
capital budgeting, will raise its hurdle rates, while the unconstrained 
airline, which uses FAR-based capital  budgeting,  will not. This diver- 
gence in the way the two airlines value physical assets might be ex- 
18. See, i.e.,  Barro (1990) for an overview and a recent empirical  treatment  of the 
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pected to lead the constrained  airline  to sell some of its planes to the 
unconstrained airline. Conversely, if  there is  a positive sentiment 
shock, the prediction  goes the other way-the  constrained  airline  will 
cut its hurdle  rates, and become a net buyer of assets."9 
VII.  Conclusions 
Is a  dead? The answer to this question would seem to depend on the 
job that one has in mind for P. If the job is to predict cross-sectional 
differences in stock returns, then P may well be dead, as Fama and 
French  (1992)  argue.  But if the  job is to help in determining  hurdle  rates 
for capital budgeting  purposes, then P may be only slightly hobbled. 
Certainly,  any argument  in favor of using P as a capital  budgeting  tool 
must be carefully qualified,  unlike in the typical textbook treatment. 
Nonetheless, in the right  circumstances,  the textbook CAPM  approach 
to setting hurdle  rates may ultimately  be justifiable. 
This defense of  P as a capital budgeting tool rests on three key 
premises. First, one must be willing  to assume that the cross-sectional 
patterns in stock returns that have been documented in recent re- 
search-such  as the tendency of high book-to-market  stocks to earn 
higher returns-reflect  pricing errors, rather than compensation for 
fundamental  sources of risk. Second, the firm in question must have 
long horizons and be relatively unconstrained  by its current capital 
structure.  And finally, it must be the case that even though there are 
pricing  errors, a (3  estimated  from stock returns  is a satisfactory  proxy 
for the fundamental  riskiness of the firm's cash flows. 
This article was intended as a first cut at the problem of capital 
budgeting  in an inefficient  market,  and, as such, it leaves many impor- 
tant questions unanswered.  There are at least three broad  areas where 
further  research might be useful. First, there are the pragmatic  risk- 
measurement  issues raised in Section IV, namely, just how well do 
stock return  ('s actually  reflect  the fundamental  riskiness  of underlying 
firm cash flows? Are stock return (3's  more informative  about funda- 
mental risk for some classes  of  companies than for others? Does 
lengthening  the horizon over which returns are computed help mat- 
ters? Here it would clearly be desirable  to update and build on some 
of the work done in the 1970s. 
Second, as discussed in Section V, there is potentially quite a bit 
more that can be done in terms of refining  and extending the basic 
19. I use the example  of airlines  because of a very interesting  recent  paper  by Pulvino 
(1995),  who documents  exactly this sort of pattern  of asset sales in the airline  industry- 
financially  unconstrained  airlines  significantly  increase  their purchases  of used aircraft 
when prices are depressed.  As Shleifer  and Vishny (1992)  demonstrate,  this pattern  can 
arise purely  as a consequence  of liquidity  constraints  and  thus need not reflect  any stock 
market  inefficiencies. Nonetheless, in terms of generating  economically  large effects, 
such inefficiencies  are likely to give an added  kick to their story. 454  Journal of Business 
conceptual  framework.  And finally, as seen in Section VI, the theory 
developed here gives rise to some new empirical  implications,  having 
to do with cross-sectional differences in the intensity of the relation- 
ship between stock prices and corporate  investment. 
References 
Ball, R., and Brown, P. 1969. Portfolio  theory and accounting.  Journal  of Accounting 
Research 7 (Spring):  300-323. 
Banz, Rolf W. 1981. The relationship  between return and market  value of common 
stocks.  Journal  of Financial  Economics  9 (March): 3-18. 
Barro,  Robert  J. 1990.  The stock market  and investment.  Review of Financial Studies 
3 (March):  115-31. 
Basu, Sanjoy. 1977. Investment performance  of common stocks in relation to their 
price-earnings  ratios:  A test of the efficient  market  hypothesis.  Journal  of Finance 32 
(June):  663-82. 
Beaver, William;  Kettler, Paul; and Scholes, Myron. 1970. The association between 
market determined  and accounting determined  risk measures. Accounting Review 
(October):  654-82. 
Beaver, William, and Manegold, James.  1975. The  association between market- 
determined  and accounting-determined  measures of systematic risk: Some further 
evidence.  Journal of Financial  and Quantitative Analysis  (June): 231-84. 
Bhandari,  Laxmi Chand. 1988. Debt/equity  ratio and expected common  stock returns: 
Empirical  evidence. Journal  of Finance 43 (June):  507-28. 
Blanchard,  Olivier;  Rhee, Changyong;  and Summers,  Lawrence. 1993.  The stock mar- 
ket, profit,  and investment.  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics 108  (February):  115-36. 
Bosworth, Barry. 1975.  The stock market  and the economy. Brookings  Papers on Eco- 
nomic Activity,  pp. 257-300. 
Chan, Louis K. C.; Hamao, Y.; and Lakonishok,  Josef. 1991.  Fundamentals  and stock 
returns  in Japan.  Journal  of Finance 46 (December):  1739-64. 
Chan, Louis K. C.; Jegadeesh, Narasimhan;  and Lakonishok,  Josef. 1995. Evaluating 
the performance  of value versus glamour  stocks:  The impact  of selection  bias. Journal 
of Financial  Economics  38 (July): 269-96. 
Cheng, Li-Lan. 1995. The motives, timing and subsequent  performance  of seasoned 
equity issues. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, Department  of 
Economics. 
Daniel, Kent, and Titman, Sheridan. 1995. Evidence on the characteristics  of cross- 
sectional variation  in stock returns.  Working  paper. Chicago:  University  of Chicago. 
Davis,  James  L.  1994. The  cross-section of  realized stock  returns: The  pre- 
COMPUSTAT  evidence. Journal  of Finance 49 (December):  1579-93. 
DeBondt,  Werner  F. M., and  Thaler,  Richard  H. 1985.  Does the stock market  overreact. 
Journal of Finance  40 (July): 793-805. 
DeLong, J.  Bradford; Shleifer, Andrei; Summers, Lawrence H.;  and Waldmann, 
Robert  J. 1989. The size and incidence of the losses from noise trading.  Journal  of 
Finance 44 (July): 681-96. 
Fama, Eugene  F. 1991.  Efficient  capital  markets:  II. Journal  of Finance  46 (December): 
1575-1617. 
Fama, Eugene F., and French, Kenneth  R. 1992.  The cross-section  of expected stock 
returns. Journal of Finance  47 (June): 427-65. 
Fama, Eugene F., and French, Kenneth R. 1993. Common  risk factors in the returns 
on stocks  and bonds.  Journal of Financial  Economics  33 (February): 3-56. 
Fischer, Stanley, and Merton,  Robert. 1984.  Macroeconomics  and finance:  The role of 
the stock  market. Carnegie Rochester  Conference  Series on Public Policy  21:57-108. 
Froot, Kenneth  A.; Scharfstein,  David  S.; and  Stein, Jeremy  C. 1993.  Risk  management: 
Coordinating  corporate  investment  and financing  policies. Journal  of Finance 48 (De- 
cember): 1629-58. Rational Capital Budgeting  455 
Gonedes, Nicholas  J. 1973.  Evidence  on the information  content  of accounting  numbers: 
Accounting-based  and  market-based  estimates  of systematic  risk.  Journal  of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis  (June): 407-43. 
Gonedes, Nicholas J. 1975.  A note on accounting-based  and market-based  estimates  of 
systematic  risk. Journal of Financial  and Quantitative Analysis  (June): 355-65. 
Ikenberry,  David; Lakonishok,  Josef; and Vermaelen,  Theo. 1995.  Market  underreac- 
tion to open market  share repurchases.  Working  paper. N.p. 
Jaffe, Jeffrey; Keim, Donald B.; and Westerfield,  Randolph. 1989. Earnings  yields, 
market  values, and stocks returns.  Journal  of Finance 44 (March):  135-48. 
Keim, Donald B. 1983.  Size-related  anomalies  and stock return  seasonality.  Journal  of 
Financial  Economics  12 (June):  13-32. 
Keynes,  John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London:  Macmillan. 
Laffont,  Jean  Jacques,  and  Tirole,  Jean. 1988.  Repeated  auctions  of incentive  contracts, 
investment, and bidding parity with an application  to takeovers. Rand Journal of 
Economics  19 (Winter): 516-37. 
Lakonishok,  Josef; Shleifer, Andrei;  and Vishny, Robert W. 1994. Contrarian  invest- 
ment, extrapolation,  and risk. Journal  of Finance 49 (December):  1541-78. 
La Porta,  Rafael;  Lakonishok,  Josef; Shleifer,  Andrei;  and Vishny, Robert. 1994.  Good 
news for value stocks: Further  evidence on market  efficiency.  Working  paper. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard  University. 
Loughran,  Tim, and Ritter, Jay R. 1995.  The new issues puzzle. Journal  of Finance 50 
(March):  23-5 1. 
McKinlay,  A. Craig.  1995.  Multifactor  models  do not explain  deviations  from  the CAPM. 
Journal of Financial  Economics  38 (May): 3-28. 
Miller,  Merton  M., and Rock, Kevin. 1985.  Dividend  policy under  asymmetric  informa- 
tion. Journal  of Finance 40 (September):  1021-52. 
Morck, Randall;  Shleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert. 1990. The stock market and 
investment:  Is the market a sideshow?  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  pp. 
157-215. 
Myers, Stewart, and Majluf, N.  1984. Corporate  financing  and investment decisions 
when firms  have information  that  investors  do not have. Journal  of Financial  Econom- 
ics 13 (June): 187-221. 
Pulvino,  Todd. 1995.  Do asset fire-sales  exist? An empirical  investigation  of commercial 
aircraft  transactions.  Working  paper. Cambridge,  Mass.: Harvard  University. 
Rosenberg,  Barr;  Reid, Kenneth;  and Lanstein, Ronald. 1985. Persuasive  evidence of 
market inefficiency.  Journal of Portfolio  Management  11:9-17. 
Scharfstein,  David. 1988.  The disciplinary  role of takeovers.  Review  of Economic  Stud- 
ies 55 (April):  185-99. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert. 1992. Liquidation  values and debt capacity: A 
market  equilibrium  approach.  Journal  of Finance 47 (September):  1343-66. 
Spiess, D. Katherine,  and Affleck-Graves,  John. 1995. Underperformance  in long-run 
stock returns  following  seasoned equity offerings.  Journal  of Financial  Econonics 38 
(July):  241-67. 
Stattman,  Dennis. 1980. Book values and stock returns. Chicago MBA:  A Journal of 
Selected  Papers  4:25-45. 
Stein, Jeremy C. 1988. Takeover threats and managerial  myopia. Journal of Political 
Economy  96 (February):  61-80. 
Stein, Jeremy C. 1989. Efficient  capital markets,  inefficient  firms:  A model of myopic 
corporate  behavior.  Quarterly Journal of Economics  104 (November):  655-69. 